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Abstract: The development of cross-border e-commerce highlights the importance of service integration and information 
sharing. This paper considers a cross-border B2B supply chain which consists of a local manufacturer and a foreign trade 
service integrator. The service integrator holds the service cost structure as private information. The optimal decisions and 
maximum expected profits of the manufacturer and service integrator are analyzed under two scenarios：no information 
sharing versus information sharing. The paper finds that information sharing always benefit the manufacturer but not for the 
service integrator. In the meanwhile, the value of information is increased with the manufacturer’s forecast uncertainty about 
the service integrator’s service cost. The whole supply chain can get pareto improvement through the Nash bargaining 
mechanism. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Cross-border e-commerce usually refers to transactions, payments and logistics in different countries 
through e-commerce 
[1]
. As a new type of e-commerce, cross-border e-commerce has been widely spread and 
developed rapidly under the national strategy background of "One Belt and One Road (B&R)" in China 
[2]
. 
According to the data from China's cross-border e-commerce research center in May 2017, China's cross-border 
e-commerce import and export reached 6.6 trillion yuan in 2016, Increased by 38.7% over the same period in 
2015, and B2B accounted for 88.7% of total transactions in China's cross-border e-commerce.  
China’s B2B cross-border e-commerce SME (small- and medium-sized enterprises) trade occurs mainly 
through foreign trade service integrators
 [3]
. These all-in-one integrators (e.g., Onetouch.alibaba.com, 
Globalsources.com, DHgate.com) with integrated services for international logistics, cross-border payments, 
internet financing, multilingual services, etc. 
[4]
. These integrated services can not only enhance the platform 
experience, but also bring new customers to the SME. For example, DHgate.com is rich in supporting services 
to10 million enterprises and individual buyers from nearly 230 countries and regions provided by specialist 
partners from logistics (UPS, DHL, FedEx, TNT, etc.), to payments (MasterCard, VISA, American Express, 
etc.), to technology innovation, to internet financing (China Construction Bank, etc.).  
Due to the dynamics of resources, customers and services, these service integrators often keep some private 
information in order to seek more profits, which causes the information asymmetry problem
[5]
. The existence of 
asymmetric information often leads to the loss of efficiency and brings difficulties to the coordination of the 
supply chain system. How to collaborate with these service integrators under information asymmetry become a 
key issue restricting the development of china’s cross-border e-commerce.  
Cost information asymmetry is ubiquitous in distributed supply chain systems
 [6]
. Kumar and Pugazhendhi
[7]
 
indicated that information sharing is one of the important tools of coordination among firms in a supply chain, 
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and allow enterprises to refine their strategies of supply chain to maximize their profits. Ketzenberg et al.
[8] 
reported that the value of information sharing can range from 0 to 30% profit increase. 
  Information sharing has been extensively studied in previous literature. The early research focuses on the 




). Recent literature has 
been studied different types of information (e.g., demand, cost, inventory) sharing under complex competition. 
Some papers focused on demand information sharing. For example, Zhang 
[11]
 took the leakage effect into 
account and suggested that the retailers will not share private demand information with the supplier in Cournot 
duopoly. Li and Zhang 
[12]
 examined how the level of confidentiality influences firms information sharing 
decisions. Ha et al. 
[13]
 focus on vertical information sharing under two competing supply chains consider 
production diseconomies. Jiang and Hao 
[14]
 examined both vertical and horizontal information sharing under 
different channel structures. Cost-information sharing has also been studied by several scholars. For example, 
Yao et al. 
[15]
 explored cost information sharing in a supply chain by considering value-added costs as retailer’s 
private information, they indicated that the retailers are not always better off with information sharing. Zhou and 
Zhu 
[16]
 investigated the incentive for cost-information sharing under Cournot competition. Kostamis and 
Duenyas 
[17] 
demonstrated the value of both cost and demand information sharing. Zhao et al. 
[18] 
considered a 
supply chain with two service providers competing for one client. Setak et al. 
[19] 
demonstrated that the 
manufacturer with cooperative advertising program can encourage the retailers to share their cost information. 
In this paper, we study information asymmetry in a cross-border B2B supply chain composed of a local 
manufacturer and a synthesized service integrator, the actual service cost is known only to services integrator 
herself unless she shares it with the manufacturer. We aim to address the following problems: 
a) How do supply chain members decide under complete and uncomplete information scenario? 
b) Can service cost information sharing improve supply chain profitability? 
c) Is it possible to induce service integrator to sharing information?  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the problem and the 
assumptions of the model. In Section 3, we present the decision under no information sharing case. In Section 4, 
we present the decision under complete information. In Section 5, we analyze the model and discuss a profit 
distribution mechanism. In Section 6, we conclude the paper and give the future research directions. 
 
2. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
We consider a cross-border B2B supply chain composed of a local manufacturer and a cross-border service 
integrator (SI). The SI provide service package at price     to foreign buyers, the service package includes 
pre-sales consulting, supplier selection, supplier qualification certification, logistics and route selection, 
financing loans, export tax rebates, etc. The manufacturer produces a single product at a unit cost    and sells 
his product to foreign buyers at a price     through SI, and need to pay SI a membership fee K. The assumption 
reflects the practice of cross-border service platforms (e.g., Globalsourse.com, Alibaba.com, 
Made-in-China.com,etc.) who use the membership mechanisms. We assume that the membership fee K is fixed 
and exogenous to our model. We note that in this paper, the fixed membership fee K does not have any effect on 
the results, then K is not included in our model analysis and discussion. 
Let        denote the consumer demand from the manufacturer and SI, respectively. We utilize a linear 
demand function which is widely used in supply chain literature (Tsay and Agrawal
[19]
 ; Dan et al.
[5]
). The 
corresponding demand functions to the manufacturer and the SI are described as follows: 
                                                                         (1) 
                                                                            (2) 
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Where     corresponds to market potential;      is the coefficient of service price elasticity 
of   ;     is the coefficient of price elasticity of   . The parameters    is the SI’s services sensitivities of 
the service demand and    are the free-ride services sensitivities to the manufacturer (        .  is the 
service package level determined by SI. We use the service package to represent the all forms of SI’s services 
together which is widely used in previous literature (Li et al. 
[20]
; Dan et al. 
[21]
). The conditions     ≥ 0,    ≥ 
0 are specified to ensure that both demand non-negative. 




    
 
 
                                        （3） 
Where η is an efficiency parameter for the SI 's cost,
    
  
   
     
   
  . this cost parameter is assumed to 
be the private information, known only to the SI. Many streams of research find that firms may protect their 
advantage by hiding their cost information, and they are reluctant to reveal their private information for the risk 
of information leakage 
[11], [12]
. From the manufacturer's point of view, this parameter is a random variable with a 
known probability distribution f (η).  
With the above notation, the SI’s and the manufacturer’s profit function are given by 
                                               （4） 
          
 
 
                                   （5） 
There is no leader in this supply chain.The manufacturer and SI make price decisions independently of 
each other. Thus, the SI determines its price    and service level   to maximize its profit    . Uninformed 
manufacturer determines its price    to maximize its profit   . 
For ease of reference, we add super script ND, SD on the equilibrium outcomes, where ND indicates that 
SI neither share signals nor cooperate in decision making, SD indicates that SI share signals and independently 
make decisions. We will contrast the optimal policies of both channel partners in the two cases: incomplete 
information when the manufacturer didn’t get the exact cost information (Section 3), and information sharing 
when the manufacturer knows η exactly (Section 4). 
 
3. THE CASE OF NO INFORMATION SHARING (ND) 
In this section, we solve the game-theoretic problem for the case of no information sharing. The actual 
service cost is known only to SI herself unless she shares it with the manufacturer. The manufacturer does not 
know the exact value of  , but knows its distribution. According to Yao et al. [15], we assume that   is 
uniformly distributed, i.e.,                   and   are the average and deviation of the service cost 
efficiency, respectively. 
   The manufacturer and the SI make their decisions to maximize their own profit respectively. The model in 
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Proposition1: Under the no information sharing case, the manufacturer’s optimal prices, SI’s optimal service 
price and optimal service level can be given as: 
 
   
   
    
            
           
 
           
                
       
                                      (7) 
 
  
   
  
       
                                     (8) 
          
   
       
                                        (9) 
Where            
    
Proof： 
Suppose the condition           
    satisfy, since          ,which indicates that  
       
   .  
The hessian matrix    
      
    
  is negative definite when the conditions        
    satisfy, 
so    
   is jointly concave with     .  




   
                      
      
 
   
   
                 
                           (10) 
Further substituting   
  and   into the manufacturers’ profit functions in Eqs. (6), we get
   
   
   
      <0, 
by solving the first-order conditions, we can obtain the manufacturers’ optimal prices   
  . 
 
Corollary 1. The optimal profits of the manufacturer and SI are: 
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Where      
   
 
 
       
               
                      
                     
   
            
           
 
           
   
 
4. THE CASE OF INFORMATION SHARING (SD) 
In this section, we solve the game-theoretic problem for the case where the manufacturer has complete 
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Proposition2: Under the information sharing case, the manufacturer’s optimal prices, the SI’s optimal service 
price and optimal service level can be given as: 
  
   
                        
  
           
  
                                                                (14) 
  
   
  
       
                                                                                    (15) 
    
   
       
                                                                                   (16) 
Proof:  
Following the same procedure as what is done in the proof of Proposition1, we have the result. 
 
Corollary 2. The optimal profits of the manufacturer and SI are: 
  
   
                    
        
 
           
   
                           (17) 
   
   
   
        
                                       (18) 
Above, we have obtained closed form solutions for all decision variables and the respective profits of both 
parties in terms of the market parameters. The difference in profits in these two cases will give us the value of 




5.1 The value of information sharing  
In this subsection, we study the interesting question of how the profit of each channel partner changes from 
the incomplete information case to the complete information case. 
 
Proposition 3. (i)The manufacturer’s profit will always increase when the information about the SI's service 
cost structure is shared with him. The amount of increase     is given by: 
    
    
         
          
         
 
     
           
     
                                                                (19) 
(ii) The SI does not benefit from the information sharing, her profit is the same as SD and ND scenario, 
        
      
    . 
(iii) Service cost information sharing can improve the whole supply chain profitability,        >0. 
 
Proof: 
By the equilibrium results given in Corollary1 and Corollary 2, we have 
      
     
   
            
       
 
  
         
     
           
     
, It is easy to verify that    >0. 
  Obviously,         
      
    ,then the amount of total supply chain profit increase is        
 . Hence the claim. 
To examine the effects of service uncertainty   on the supply members optimal decisions, we take the 
first-order partial derivatives of    with respect to  , and obtain the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4. The amount of manufacturer’s profit increase     is increased with the manufacturer’s 
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estimate uncertainty    
Proof: 
We rewrite the equation (19) as follows:        
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It can be shown that 
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Therefore 
   
  
  . 
Proposition 4 shows that the more uncertain the manufacturer’s estimate about the SI’s service cost 
structure, the higher the value of information. It would be profitable for the manufacturer if he can encourage 
the SI to share her service cost information,     would be the maximum amount the manufacturer would be 
willing to spend for the information. Notice that the SI's profit is the same as SD and ND scenario because her 
optimal service price and service level only depend on her own cost structure, so the SI has no incentives to 
share her service cost information to the manufacturer. The willingness of SI to share her cost information can 
be achieved by a profit allocation mechanism. Next section we will use a Nash bargaining model to solve this 
problem. 
 
5.2 Nash bargaining solution  
In this subsection, we want to figure out how to align benefits between members and create motivation to 
induce service integrator to sharing information.  
Let    
      
  respresent the portion of the extra-profit the manufacturer and the SI received at the 
information sharing scenario, respectively. In order to ensure the success of the information sharing, an optimal 
profit scheme is acceptable to both the manufacturer and the SI only if    
        
   . 
According to Nash
[23]
,We assume that both the manufacturer and the retailer have the following utility 
functions: 
 
                                           
                                       (20) 
                                             
                                       (21) 
. 
Where    
      
           are the bargaining power for manufacturer and SI, respectively. 
Bargaining power is determined by negotiation skills, risk tolerance and bargaining tactics, etc. 
The optimal bargaining profit scheme is obtained by maximizing the system utility function: 
 
              
         
    
       
      
     
                          （22） 
The optimal solution of this problem is    
  
  
     
   ,     
  
  
     
   .  
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Where    
    
         
          
         
 
     
           
     
. Thus, both the manufacturer and the SI can gain from 
information sharing, which leads to a win-win solution for the whole cross-border B2B supply chain. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we present a cross-border B2B supply chain composed of a local manufacturer and a service 
integrator who face a demand sensitive to product price, service price, and service level. We assume only 
services integrator has private information about her service cost to reflect the information asymmetry between 
supply members. The manufacturer is assumed to be the Stackelberg leader, and two scenarios are analyzed: no 
information sharing case and the complete information case. Our results indicate that information sharing 
always has a positive impact on the manufacturer’s performance but not for the service integrator. The service 
integrator would be motivated to share its private information with the manufacturer under some profits 
allocation mechanisms．  
Our research can be extended in many two directions. First, we can figure out what kind of contracts can 
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